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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: CaseNo.20060354-CA 
vs. 
AARON MERWORTH, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for one count of Illegal Possession/Use of 
Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code §58-37-
8(2)(a)(i); one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code § 58-37a-5(l); and Purchase/Possession of Tobacco by Minor, 
a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 76-10-105, in the Third District 
Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, Judge, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002), which 
grants the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over criminal cases that do not involve 
first-degree felony or capital offenses. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Did trial court err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence 
resulting from his arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment? 
2. Is Defendant's interaction with Officer Olsen a level-one or level-two stop? 
Standard of Review 
This court reviews the "factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard." State 
v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62,1 8, 6 P.3d 1133 (quotations and citations omitted). This court 
reviews "conclusions of law for correctness with some discretion given to the 
application of the legal standards to the underlying facts." State v. Brake, 2002 UT 
App 190 a t t 11,51 P.3d 31. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following are statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions whose 
interpretation is relevant to this appeal: 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) 
3. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-105 
4. U.S. CON., AMEND IV. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of Illegal Possession/Use of Controlled 
Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(2005); one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code § 58-37a-5(l) (2005); and one count of Purchase/Possession of 
Tobacco by Minor, a Class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 76-10-(2005). 
R. at 1-3. Defendant was arrested pursuant to above charges. R. at 4. 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, which included marijuana and drug 
paraphernalia that was seized during the search of his person. R. at 16. He filed a 
written Motion to Suppress arguing a lack of reasonable suspicion and illegal 
detention. R. at 17-20. At an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court denied 
Defendant's motion. R. at 25 and 64:28. 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to all charges and was sentenced to a 
suspended jail term and probation. R. at 30-40. However, Defendant later filed a 
Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence which was granted by the trial court and was placed 
on probation for twenty-four months. R. at 42-45, 57-58 and 63. The Defendant filed a 
timely notice of appeal. R. at 47-48. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 25, 2005, Officer Olsen and Officer Flores were on their 
bikes patrolling the area around Liberty Park around mid-afternoon between 900 South 
to 1300 South and from 500 East to 700 East in Salt Lake County. R. 64:4. Officer 
Olsen first spotted Defendant walking with other individuals out of the northwest 
corner of the park. Id. As Officers Olsen and Flores continued to observe Defendant 
and three other individuals turning up an intersection on 400 East, they noticed 
Defendant and another person they recognized continue on toward a house while the 
other three individuals sat down on the curb. R. at 64:5-6. Officer Olsen approached 
the three on the curb and asked them what they were doing. Id. They said they were 
waiting for a friend and waiting to use the bathroom, since they could not all go at the 
same time. Li Soon thereafter, the Officers saw Defendant and the individual they 
recognized emerge from the house and start walking back towards the three 
individuals with whom they were speaking. R. at 64:6-7. Defendant was about three 
houses away from the Officers at the time. Id Officer Olsen noticed that Defendant 
looked a bit startled when he saw them talking with the three individuals on the curb; 
yet, he continued to walk towards the Officers and his friends. R. at 64:7. Officer 
Olsen then casually asked Defendant if he could talk with him briefly; Defendant 
replied, "Sure." R. at 64:7-8. Officer Olsen asked the Defendant what he was doing 
and Defendant said he had just come from his house. R. at 64:8. Officer Olsen told 
Defendant his friends said he had just gone to the house to get them some drugs. Id. 
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Defendant answered, "I don't know anything about that." Id. Officer Olsen then asked 
Defendant if he had any drugs on him and the Defendant said, "Just a little marijuana." 
Id. Officer Olsen then asked Defendant to produce the marijuana and he did. 
At no point did Officer Olsen make any promises, threaten, or change his tone of 
voice while conversing with Defendant. R. at 64:9. Defendant never attempted to walk 
away from Officer Olsen. Id, Officer Olsen never asked for Defendant's identification. 
Id. No weapons were displayed by either Officer. IcL During this time, Officer Flores 
was six or seven feet away speaking with the other individual who left the house with 
the Defendant. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court properly denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
2. Defendant's interaction with Officer Olsen falls within a first level stop 
because Defendant's encounter was entirely voluntary. A reasonable person in this 
situation would have felt free to leave because none of the Trujillo factors were 
present. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress because 
Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Defendant's encounter with 
Officer Olsen constituted a level-one stop. A level-one stop is "a consensual encounter 
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wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning by an officer. Since 
the encounter is consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 
f 34, 63 P.3d 650. The court has identified four factors that elevate a consensual level-
one encounter to a level-two stop; namely, "the threatening presence of several 
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, physical touching of the person of the 
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 
officer's request might be compelled." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah App. 
1987). 
This court reviews "the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard." State 
v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, | 8, 6 P.3d 1133. The court also reviews "conclusions of law 
based on these findings for correctness." Veteto, 2000 UT 62 at f 8. 
This court reviews the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion to 
suppress for correctness. While appellate courts do not extend any deference to the 
trial court in its application of the law to its factual findings in cases which involve a 
search and seizure, a level-one stop does not amount to a search and seizure. State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, PI5, 103 P.3d 699. An encounter rises to a level-two seizure only 
when, "a reasonable person, based on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not in 
the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he believes he is 
not free to leave." State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. Ct. 1994). Therefore, 
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this court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness with a measure of 
discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts. 
Veteto,2000UTat1T8. 
After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court made the following 
conclusions: 
You've only got two cops. You've got five men. Everything's consensual. I 
think a reasonable person would have felt free to leave right up until Mr. 
Merworth (Defendant) incriminated himself. Your motion's denied. 
R. at 64:28. 
A. THE DEFENDANT'S ENCOUNTER WITH OFFICER OLSEN 
INVOLVED A LEVEL-ONE STOP. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision to deny Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress because Defendant's encounter with Officer Olsen was voluntary. The 
Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged three levels of police encounters with the 
public that are constitutionally permissible; 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his or her will; (2) an officer may seize a 
person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; however the detention must be temporary and last 
no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Dietman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-618 (Utah 1987). 
A level-one stop is "a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an 
officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time. A seizure within the meaning of the 
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fourth amendment does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an 
individual on the street and questions him, if the person is willing to listen." Bean, 869 
P.2d at 986. 
An encounter rises to a level-two seizure only when, "a reasonable person, based 
on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with the 
officer's investigation, but because he believes he is not free to leave." Id "A seizure 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment occurs only when the officer by means of 
physical force or show of authority has in some way restricted the liberty of a person." 
State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987). 
Circumstances that tend to indicate a seizure has occurred include: 
1) Threatening presence of several officers; 
2) The display of a weapon by an officer; 
3) Physical touching of the person of the citizen, 
4) The use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 
Officer's request might be compelled. 
Bean, 869 P.2d at 986 (citing Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87). However, contrary to 
Defendant's claims, the record contains no evidence to support any of the four Trujillo 
factors: there were only two officers at the encounter, as opposed to five men; the 
officers were carrying their weapons, but never brandished them, or even displayed 
them or referred to them; the officers never touched Defendant; finally, Officer 
Olsen's language and tone of voice was non-threatening and non-coercive. This court 
should affirm the trial court's decision. 
8 
1. Threatening Presence of Several Officers 
As to the first factor, the trial court correctly noted that, "You've only got two 
cops. You've got five men." R. at 64:28. 
However, Officer Olsen first asked Defendant if he could speak to him and he 
said yes. R. at 64:8. Since the Defendant volunteered to speak with Officer Olsen, it 
would be unreasonable to suggest that the Defendant also considered the officer a 
threat. Moreover, the fact that there were five men to two police officers indicates that 
the officers were clearly outnumbered and posed no numerical or logistical threat to 
the Defendant. Thus, Defendant's argument that Officer Olsen "alienated" the 
Defendant from the other four men by telling him that his friends had just incriminated 
him is mere sophistry. Defendant disagreed with the officer's assertion as soon as it 
was uttered. 
In State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, 111 P.3d 808, the officers received 
information that drug transactions had been taking place in a condominium. Id at | 10. 
The officer stopped the defendant and asked him if he knew that he was driving an 
uninsured vehicle. Id The officer also asked the defendant to open his mouth to 
demonstrate that it did not contain drugs. Id The defendant got nervous and began 
moving objects around in his mouth with his tongue. Id The officer told the defendant 
to spit out the contents in his mouth and the Defendant spit out 15 balloons containing 
illegal narcotics. Id. The Court held that under the totality of the circumstances, the 
police had specific articulable facts which warranted the detention. Id The warrantless 
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search of defendant was justified by exigent circumstances. Id. There was a clear 
indication that evidence would be found, and the search procedure used by officers 
was reasonable. Id. 
Unlike Alverez, Defendant in the instant case was not detained against his will. 
Officer Olsen approached him and posed a few non-threatening and non-coercive 
questions which Defendant could either answer or demur. He could have also simply 
walked away or asked his own questions. Moreover, Defendant consented to the 
encounter with Officer Olsen. Defendant's encounter with Officer Olsen did not rise to 
a level-two seizure because "based on the totality of the circumstances, the Defendant 
kept in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation and believed he was 
free to leave." Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. Even if Defendant's encounter with Officer 
Olsen rose to a level-two seizure, it did not meet the circumstances that tend to 
indicate a seizure has occurred. 
2. Display of a Weapon by an Officer 
Since Officer Olsen and Flores were on duty, they were in uniform, on their 
bikes and wearing their weapons. At no point did they brandish their firearms or direct 
their weapons at the Defendant. 
3. Physical Touching of the Person of the Citizen 
The record indicates that Defendant was never touched by either officer. 
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4. Use of Language or Tone of Voice Indicating that Compliance Might be Compelled 
At the suppression hearing, the court noted, "You don't have any evidence on 
tone of voice." R. at 64:19. However, Defendant argues that the real meaning of 
Officer Olsen's language and the substance of his message was that he knew 
Defendant was guilty of drug-dealing. 
Defendant next argues that Officer Olsen did not pursue a typical line of police 
questioning, but rather turned immediately to accusations, claiming when Officer 
Olsen chose to use an unsupported accusation "they gave you money and you were 
supposed to bring them back some drugs," in an attempt to get Defendant to agree 
(confess), the lie (the accusation) used by the officer was inclupatory, accusatory, and 
offensive. R. at 64:14. 
However, Defendant confuses an accusation with strategies used by police 
officers to render a confession to a crime. "A Defendant's will is not overborne simply 
because he is led to believe that the government's knowledge of his guilt is greater 
than it actually is." State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998) (quoting Ledbetter v. 
Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1072 (6th Cir. 1994)). "Incriminating statements obtained by 
government acts, threats, or promises that permit the defendant's will to be overborne 
run afoul of the Fifth Amendment and are inadmissible at trial as evidence of guilt." 
United States v. Blue, 122 Fed. Appx. 427, 430-431 (10th Cir. 2005). "Without more, 
however, misrepresentations, ruses, and trickery by questioning authorities do not 
render a voluntary confession involuntary." (Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 
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(1969)) (holding that interrogator's misrepresentation to suspect that accomplice had 
already confessed did not render suspect's confession coerced) See also United States, 
v. Unser, 165 F.3d 755, 766-67 (10th Cir. 1999) (agents employed a "measure of 
subterfuge" by inducing defendant to return to their offices when defendant did not 
know he was the target of a criminal investigation, and defendant believed officers 
merely wanted to help him retrieve his snowmobiles; nonetheless, defendant's will 
was not overborne and statements were admissible); Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 
1311 (10 Cir. 1998) (defendant's inculpatory statements were admissible even though 
officer falsely told defendant that his fingerprints had been found at the crime scene)" 
United States v. Blue, 122 Fed. Appx. 427, 430-431 (10th Cir. 2005). 
In State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 984 P.2d 1009 "officers made thirty-six 
false statements, the overwhelming majority involving complete fabrications about the 
testimonial and physical evidence against the defendant. State v. Bunting, 2002 UT 
App 195, 1fl5, 51 P.3d 37, [citing Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^[21]. The officers 
repeatedly made misrepresentations that they had numerous eyewitnesses and co-
defendants testimony that would implicate the defendant, falsely informing him that he 
had been the subject of intensive undercover investigation. Id. "Although the officers 
had no physical evidence linking the defendant to the crime scene, they told him that 
they had a wealth of physical evidence so linking him." Id. The Supreme Court held 
that "the number and nature of the misrepresentations came close to or exceeded the 
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voluntariness threshold." Bunting, 2002 App 195 at f 19 (citing Rettenberger, 1999 UT 
at|20). 
Unlike Bunting, Officer Olsen chose permissible tactics by questioning 
Defendant one time only. Defendant's will was not overborne; therefore he was not 
coerced nor was his statement rendered involuntary. Hence, none of the four Trujillo 
factors were met and Defendant's encounter with the police officers constituted a 
level-one stop. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite Defendant's claims to the contrary, his interaction with Officer Olsen 
was a level-one stop. Because there were two officers for five suspects and no show of 
force, or intimidation, or egregious acts of trickery on the part of the police officers, 
Defendant's statements and actions were completely voluntary. Based on the 
foregoing, this court should affirm the lower court's ruling and deny Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on / ^August 2006. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
2U 
Fames Cope 
'Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of the foregoing 
brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140320, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to Sharla M. Dunroe, Attorney for 
the Appellant, 424 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 on this ^ day of 
August 2006. 
( Ernies Cope 
^ D e p u t y District Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Appellant as indicated 
above this day of August 2006. 
C&fe*. . 
14 
ADDENDUM A 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as 
otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia 
to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, 
process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or 
otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
76-10-105. Buying or possessing cigars, cigarettes, or tobacco by minors — Penalty --
Compliance officer authority — Juvenile court jurisdiction. 
(1) Any 18 year old person who buys or attempts to buy, accepts, or has in his possession 
any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form is guilty of a class C misdemeanor and subject to: 
(a) a minimum fine or penalty of $60; and 
(b) participation in a court-approved tobacco education program, which may include a 
participation fee. 
(2) Any person under the age of 18 who buys or attempts to buy, accepts, or has in his 
possession any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Juvenile Court and: 
(a) a minimum fine or penalty of $60; and 
(b) participation in a court-approved tobacco education program, which may include a 
participation fee. 
(3) A compliance officer appointed by a board of education under Section 53A-3-402 may 
issue citations for violations of this section committed on school property. Cited violations 
shall be reported to the appropriate juvenile court. 
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